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ABSTRACT
In  a standard two-sector neoclassical model with distortions, capital mobility can render
the steady state indeterminate, in the sense that there exist infinitely many convergent paths.
In  the closed economy with no international capital mobility, the utility function must be linear
or close
to it for indeterminacy to occur, while in the open economy the shape  of the utility function
makes  no difference. The reason is that in the no mobility case changes in aggregate
investment  must be matched by changes in aggregate consumption, while in the case of full
capital mobility they can  simply be financed by borrowing abroad. The paper provides some
theoretical  underpinnings to the concerns that de-regulating the capital account may be
destabilizing.
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Can increased capital mobility be destabilizing? This question is often asked in the policy
literature. Analysts fret over the consequences of large waves of capital in‡ows and out‡ows,
and worry that such cycles may be the result of self-ful…lling prophecies. Some go as far
as to advocate restrictions on capital mobility, or at least gradualism in de-regulating the
capital account.1 Yet the theoretical foundations for such concerns aren’t always clear.
It is well understood by now that under some conditions closed economy versions of
standard neoclassical models can be subject to indeterminacy, in the sense that there are
multiple converging paths to the steady state.2 It is seldom discussed what role, if any,
capital mobility plays in making indeterminacy possible. In this paper we show that capital
mobility can indeed cause indeterminacy in situations where, and under parameter values for
which, it could otherwise not occur. This mechanism could provide one kind of theoretical
underpinning for the concerns that de-regulating the capital account may be “destabilizing.”
The reason why capital mobility can contribute to indeterminacy is simple. Indetermi-
nacy in investment and savings decisions is possible if, while going along an equilibrium
path, a representative agent decides to invest more –and then asset prices and returns move
in such a way as to make this decision optimal.3 In the closed economy, if the representative
agent wants to invest more she must …rst curtail consumption. If the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution in consumption is su¢ciently low, doing so will be very costly, and the
desire to smooth consumption will dominate the incentive to invest more. Hence, in the
closed economy indeterminacy can only occur if the utility function is linear or close to it.
This, of course, runs counter to all recent empirical evidence on elasticities of intertemporal
substitution.
In the open economy matters are very di¤erent. An agent who wants to invest more can
1For the latest in policy thinking on capital account liberalization and its consequences, see Eichengreen
et al (1998) and Fischer et al (1998).
2For examples, see the survey paper by Benhabib and Farmer (1997).
3If there are increasing marginal returns to capital, for instance, holding more of it will raise its marginal
product.
1always borrow from the outside world, and hence need not reduce her consumption level.
The curvature of the utility function does not a¤ect investment decisions, and indeterminacy
can occur for any degree of intertemporal substitution. Only certain technological conditions
have to be satis…ed.
Note also that in all the examples of indeterminacy we construct below, the dynamic
paths for investment and consumption are not uniquely determined. As a result, in the open
economy the current account and the capital ‡ows that …nance it are not uniquely determined
either. If sunspots moved the economy from one equilibrium trajectory to another feasible
equilibrium trajectory, then the capital and current accounts and the real exchange rate
could be subject to sudden and potentially large movements guided exclusively by “animal
spirits.” This would give credence to the concerns of policymakers about volatile capital
‡ows and relative prices.
We formalize this idea in a perfectly standard setup. Our point of departure is the recent
two sector model of Benhabib and Nishimura (1998). Aside from being relatively simple, this
framework does not rely on increasing returns to generate indeterminacy. Given the current
state of play in empirical estimates of technological increasing returns, this is an added
advantage.4 Small externalities or other distortions (see below) are all that is required to
generate multiplicity in the closed economy.5
The role of capital mobility in generating indeterminacy is an issue that only recently
begun to be examined in the literature. To our knowledge, the …rst relevant paper was Lahiri
(1997). Unlike us, Lahiri is concerned with multiple growth trajectories in growth models
with human capital. His model also relies on increasing technological returns to generate
indeterminacy, a feature that limits its empirical plausibility.6
4On empirical estimates, see Hall (1990), Basu and Fernald (1994a,b) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and
Rebelo (1995). These papers …nd little evidence of increasing marginal returns.
5The Benhabib-Nishimura framework does not assume increasing marginal returns. It does allow for
pro…ts, which result from decreasing private returns (which coexist with constant social returns because of
externalities). If one assumes a …xed cost of entry to determine the number of …rms, then that sector would
have increasing average returns, which is in line with current empirical …ndings.
6After competing a …rst draft of this paper we also became aware of the work by Weder (1999). Like
2The paper is structured as follows. We start in Section 2 below by replicating the result
of Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) that indeterminacy can occur only if the utility function
is linear or close to it. In section 3 we then open the economy to perfect capital mobil-
ity. For simplicity we assume that the consumption good is traded while the investment
good is non-traded. In that setup we prove our main result: in the economy with capital
mobility indeterminacy can occur regardless of the degree of intertemporal substitution in
consumption. Only a condition on the technology must be satis…ed: the non-traded good
must be labor intensive from the private perspective, but capital intensive from the social
perspective.
In Section 4 we show that this result is not the arti…ce of particular number of goods
considered nor the choice of which are tradeable and which are not. We generalize the
underlying structure by allowing for a traded consumption good and a traded capital good
such as equipment. We also allow the nontraded goods sector to produce both a nontraded
consumption good and nontraded capital such as structures. Strikingly, the fundamental
characteristics of this generalized model (and hence the conditions for indeterminacy to
occur) are determined exclusively by the relative sectorial intensities in nontraded capital,
just as in Section 3.
Finally, in section 5 we show that externalities are not necessary either to obtain our
main indeterminacy result. Other distortions that introduce a wedge between private and
social returns have the same e¤ect. We study the role of factor taxation —in particular,
policies that tax (or subsidize) factors in an asymmetric way across sectors. Once again, in
the open economy the shape of the utility function plays no role in ensuring determinacy
or indeterminacy. If the wedge created by tax rates causes the non-traded good to be labor
intensive from the private perspective, but capital intensive from the social perspective, the
steady state is again indeterminate.
Lahiri’, Weder relies on increasing returns to obtain his results. His analyis is also limited to the case in which
the consumption good is tradeable and the capital good is not, in contrast to the more general speci…cation
we study in section 4 below.
32 The Two-Sector Closed Economy
Consider a closed economy7 inhabited by an in…nite-lived representative agent who maxi-
mizes the intertemporal utility function
Z 1
0
[U(CT) ¡ V (L)]e
¡½tdt (1)
where CT is consumption, L labor supply, ½ the parameter of time preference. As usual,
assume that U (¢) is concave, the consumption good is normal, and that V (¢) is convex and
not linear in L.
On the production side, there are two sectors with one producing consumption goods (YT)
and the other investment goods (YN). The production functions are assumed to be Cobb-
Douglas with externality components. The agent’s decisions are to choose LT;LN;KT;KN


















N; where ¯0 + ¯1 + b0 + b1 = 1 (3)
_ K = YN ¡ ±K (4)
LT + LN = L; KT + KN = K (5)
and CT = YT, with initial capital stock K0 as given. ± is the depreciation rate of capital.








N represent output e¤ects




















7In this section, we follow Benhabib and Nishimura (1998).
4+ ¹ w(L ¡ LT ¡ LN) + ¹ z(K ¡ KT ¡ KN)
where ¹ q, ¹ z and ¹ w are the utility price of the capital good, the rental rate of capital goods,
and the wage rate of labor, all in terms of the price of the consumption good.








Then, it turns out that the dynamics of the solution can be described by a pair of di¤erential

























where E1 = [¡U00(CT)CT=U0(CT)], and where we have implicitly expressed the rental rate z
as a function of q and K. Below we derive the partial derivatives of this function.
This system can be readily linearized around its unique steady state. Appendix A also
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where E2 = [1 ¡ E1(q=CT)(@CT=@q)].
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+ ½ + ±) =
(½ + ±)(¯0 + b0)
(®1 + a1)(¯0 + b0) ¡ (®0 + a0)(¯1 + b1)
(12)
Consider now what happens if ¾ = 0 (i.e., utility is linear in consumption). The …rst







We also have E1 = 0 and E2 = 1, so that the two eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are
°1 =





(®1 + a1)(¯0 + b0) ¡ (®0 + a0)(¯1 + b1)
Notice …nally that K is a state variable (cannot jump) while q is a jump variable. Hence,
the existence of a saddle path requires that one eigenvalue be positive and the other negative.
Two positive eigenvalues mean that the system is unstable, while two negative ones mean
indeterminacy. We therefore have:
Proposition 1 In the two-sector closed economy with ¾ = 0, i) if the investment good
sector is labor intensive (or capital intensive) from both the private perspective and social
perspectives 8 (°1°2 < 0), the transitional dynamics exhibits saddle-path stability; ii) if the
investment good sector is capital intensive from the private perspective (°1 > 0) and labor
intensive from the social perspective (°2 > 0), the system is unstable; and iii) if the invest-
ment good sector is labor intensive from private perspective (°2 < 0); but capital intensive
from social perspective (°1 < 0), then there are multiple (an in…nite number of) convergent
paths toward the steady state.






KN (see equation (A6) in the appendix).















6Note that in absence of externalities the two eigenvalues have opposite signs, so that the
system has a unique saddle path. With externalities, there are three possibilities. We are
interested in case iii), in which the two eigenvalues are negative and equilibrium solutions
are indeterminate.
It is clear that examples satisfying the above conditions for indeterminacy can be con-
structed with arbitrarily small external e¤ects. A simple example is:
®0 = 0:66;®1 = 0:34;a0 = 0:00;a1 = 0:00;
¯0 = 0:65;¯1 = 0:30;b0 = 0:00;b1 = 0:05;
As Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) show, in this case indeterminacy arises because of the
presence of external e¤ects. Note that the sign of the eigenvalues will depend crucially on the
expressions,
@YN
@K ¡ ± and (¡@z
@q + ½ + ±). The former depends on factor intensities re‡ecting
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (see(12)), and the latter also depends on factor intensities




so that the roots of [J] are of opposite sign, and convergence to the steady state is unique.
What is needed, then, is something to break the reciprocal relation between the Rybczynski
and the Stolper-Samuelson e¤ects. Externalities or other distortions accomplish this.
To understand the intuition behind this result, notice that in the case of ¾ = 0 the
following equation holds (see Appendix A)
_ q = (½ + ±)q ¡ z(q;K) (14)
Assume now the conditions in (iii) above are satis…ed. Starting froman arbitrary equilibrium,
consider an increase in the rate of investment above the level of its initial equilibrium, induced
by an instantaneous increase in q: Since the capital good is labor intensive from the private
perspective, an increase in the capital stock decreases its output at constant prices through
Rybczynski e¤ect (see (11) ). This keeps the output of capital goods from exploding. The
Stolper-Samuelson e¤ect, on the other hand, operates through social factor intensities. If
7the capital good is capital intensive from the social perspective, the initial rise in q causes
an increase in the returns to capital z, and requires a price decline to maintain the overall
returns to capital equal to the world interest rate or discount rate (as required by (14)). This
o¤sets the initial rise in q and it causes it to reverse direction and move toward the steady
state. Therefore, indeterminacy of equilibria happens here because the duality between the
Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson e¤ects is broken by the presence of market imperfections.
But in the closed economy if the representative agent wants to invest more she must …rst
curtail consumption. If there is some curvature on the utility function, the desire to smooth
consumption can overwhelm the e¤ects described above, doing away with indeterminacy. We
showed that indeterminacy can occur in the polar case of linear utility (¾ = 0). But it can
also occur for small values of ¾. Indeed, Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) simulate the model
and …nd that if the externalities are small (as in the parameterized examples given above),
indeterminacy arise only for values of ¾ in a very narrow range above 0. Such values of ¾
are inconsistent with most empirical estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption.
3 The Two-Sector Economy with Capital Mobility
Assume now the economy above is open to full international capital mobility, so that the
domestic representative agent can borrow from and lend to the outside world freely.In order
to facilitate the comparison between the results in this section to those in the previous
section, we retain the same economic structure of a consumption good and an investment
good. In the interest of realism we assume that the consumption good is tradable and the
capital good nontradeable. In next section we generalize the model to two consumption and
two investment goods (one tradable and one non-tradable in each case).
The agent now has access to net foreign bonds b, denominated in units of the tradable
good, that pay an exogenously given world interest rate r. The agent’s budget constraint
becomes
8_ b = rb + YT + pYN ¡ CT ¡ pI (15)
where p is the relative price of the investment or nontraded good to the traded good. Some-
times this price is referred to as the real exchange rate. Note that in (15) the traded good
is taken to be the numeraire. Note also that p is taken as exogenously given by the agent,
but is determined by market-clearing conditions. The variable I denotes gross investment,
so that the law of motion for capital is
_ K = I ¡ ±K (16)
Equations (15) and (16) can be consolidated into
_ a = ra + YT + pYN ¡ CT + K(_ p ¡ rp ¡ ±p) (17)
where a = b + pK.
The agent’s problem is to choose CT, LT, LN, I, KT, KN and b to maximize (1), subject
to (2), (3), (5) and (17), and given K0 and b0.
The Hamiltonian is
H = U(CT) ¡ V (L) + ¸(ra + YT + pYN ¡ CT + K(_ p ¡ rp ¡ ±p)) (18)
¸1(K ¡ KT ¡ KN) + ¸2(L ¡ LT ¡ LN)
where ¸ is a costate; ¸1 and ¸2 are the rental rate of capital goods and the wage rate of
labor, all in terms of the price of the consumption good.First-order conditions are
U

























_ ¸ = ¸(½ ¡ r) (23)










¡½t = 0 (25)
As is standard in international macroeconomics, we impose ½ = r; a condition that ensures
a well-de…ned steady-state with constant bond-holdings. This assumption will also imply,
by (23), that marginal utility remains constant over all time –that is, ¸ = ¹ ¸ . Substituting
¸ = ¹ ¸ into all other …rst-order conditions, by (19), we have
CT = CT(¹ ¸) = ¹ CT (26)
which means that consumption is completely smoothed.









































Notice that V 0¡1(¢) is the inverse function for V 0 (¢). Such an inverse function exists, since
V 0 (¢) is monotonic. In addition to the above …rst-order conditions, the market clearing
condition for the investment (nontraded) good and the economy’s current account are, re-
spectively




N ¡ ±K (31)




T ¡ CT (32)
If we substitute (28) and (29) into (24) and (31), we have the following dynamic equations
for K and p:







¯0+b0 ¡ ±K (34)
These two equations describe the dynamics of the open economy. The solution to this system
can then be used, in conjunction with the other conditions laid out above, to solve for all
variables of interest.














11whereasterisks denote steady-state values and
a11 =
¯1(¯0 + b0)p¤g(p¤)¯0+b0¡1




















We do not spell out the expression for a21, since its sign or value are not important for our
analysis.
Using these expression one can arrive at the following results:
Proposition 2 In the two-sector open economy with nontraded capital, i) if the nontraded
good sector is labor intensive (or capital intensive) from both the private perspective and the
social perspective (a11a22 < 0), the transitional dynamics exhibits saddle-path stability; ii)
if the nontraded good sector is capital intensive from the private perspective (a22 > 0) and
labor intensive from the social perspective (a11 > 0), the system is unstable; and iii) if the
nontraded good sector is labor intensive from the private perspective (a22 < 0); but capital
intensive from the social perspective (a11 < 0), then there are multiple (an in…nite number
of) convergent paths toward the steady state.
The same parametrized example given in the previous section, of course, applies to the




















= ½ + ± (41)
both evaluated at the steady state. Note that ¸1 is the rental price of capital. Assume the
conditions for indeterminacy in Proposition 2 hold. Starting from an arbitrary equilibrium,
consider an increase in the rate of investment above the level of its initial equilibrium, in-
duced by an instantaneous increase in real exchange rate p: As in the closed economy, the
Rybczynski e¤ect (see(40)) keeps the output of nontraded goods from exploding, while the
Stolper-Samuelson e¤ect keeps the real exchange rate p from exploding (see (41)). Again,
market imperfections break the duality between the Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson ef-
fects.
But there are the essential di¤erences between the closed economy and open economy
environments. The most striking of them is that the conditions for indeterminacy in Proposi-
tion 2 are completely independent of the degree of intertemporal substitution in consumption
(¾ does not appear). By contrast, the closed economy results in Proposition 1 required the
extreme assumption of ¾ = 0.
The intuition for the central di¤erence between the closed and open economy is straight-
forward. In the former case, if the representative agent wants to invest more she must …rst
curtail consumption. With enough curvature, the desire to smooth consumption prevails over
all other e¤ects. But in the open economy, the curvature on the utility function does not
a¤ect the investment decision, since the investor can always borrow from the outside world
without reducing her consumption level. That is why the dynamics of the open economy
13described in system (35) depends exclusively upon technologies, and so do the conditions for
indeterminacy.
The dynamics of system (35) can best be appreciated in Figures 1-3. The …rst two
of these …gures depict what happens when a unique saddle path exists. There are two
cases to consider. When the non-traded investment good is capital intensive from both the
private and social perspectives (Figure 1), the saddle path coincides with the horizontal
_ p = 0 schedule. In that case the real exchange rate is constant along all transitions. If the
non-traded investment good is labor intensive from both the private and social perspectives
(Figure 2), the saddle path is downward sloping and steeper than the _ K = 0 schedule. In
that case the real exchange rate and the stock of capital move in opposite directions along all
transitions. The case of indeterminacy is depicted in Figure 3. There are an in…nite number
of trajectories that converge to the steady state. The real exchange rate and the stock of
capital can move together or in opposite directions along the transition.
Note …nally that if the stock of capital and the real exchange rate are indeterminate in
the transition, so are the other variables of the system. In particular, the current account
and the capital ‡ows that …nance it are also indeterminate. This creates the potential for
large swings governed by expectations alone.
4 The Generalized Two-Sector Economy with Capital
Mobility
We now generalize the model and show that the results of Section 3 carry over to the general
setup with traded and non-traded consumption and investment goods. We assume that using
the same technology the traded goods sector nowproduces both the traded consumption good
(CT) and a traded capital good such as equipment (E). We also allow the nontraded goods
sector to produce both a nontraded consumption good (CN) and nontraded capital such as
structures (S).9 The model includes both traded and nontraded investment expenditure,
9A similar setup was used by Brock and Turnovsky (1994) for a di¤erent purpose.
14so that the production structure uses three factors (nontraded capital, traded capital, and
labor) in two sectors (traded and nontraded). Strikingly, the fundamental characteristics of
this generalized model (and hence the conditions for indeterminacy to occur) are determined
exclusively by the relative sectorial intensities in nontraded capital, just as in Section 3.
We set up the model brie‡y and state our result in Proposition 3. Mathematical deriva-
tions are relegated to Appendix B. The agent maximizes
Z 1
0
[U(CT;CN) ¡ V (L)]e
¡½tdt
by choosing consumption levels (CT;CN); labor supply L and its allocation (LT;LN), capital
allocation decisions (ET;EN;ST;SN); rates of investment (Ie;Is); and the rate of accumula-
tion of bonds (_ b), subject to
_ b = rb + YT + pYN ¡ CT ¡ pCN ¡ Ie ¡ pIs (42)
_ E = Ie ¡ ±eE (43)



























ET + EN = E (47)
ST + SN = S (48)
15LT + LN = L (49)
where
®0 + ®1 + ®2 + a0 + a1 + a1 = ¯0 + ¯1 + ¯2 + b0 + b1 + b2 = 1 (50)
In Appendix B we solve the agent’s problem. The optimality conditions and law of











From the solution of this system on can infer the behavior of the other variables of interest.
For instance, it is easy to show that CT = CT(p) and CN = CN(p); where C
0
T R 0; CN < 0:
Therefore consumption levels are not completely smoothed, but ‡uctuate along with real
exchange rate. Moreover, investment decisions are again independent of intertemporal e¤ects
in consumption.
The matrix B has exact the same property as the matrix in (35), in that its eigenvalues
have the same sign as a22 (or ®0¯2¡®2¯0) and a11 (or (®2 + a2)(¯0 + b0)¡(®0 + a0)(¯2 + b2)).
We therefore have:
Proposition 3 In the two-sector open economy with traded and nontraded capital, i) if the
nontraded good sector is labor intensive (or nontraded capital intensive) relative to nontraded
capital from both the private and the social perspective (a11a22 < 0), transitional dynamics
exhibits saddle-path stability; ii) if the nontraded goods sector is nontraded capital intensive
from the private perspective (a22 > 0) and labor intensive relative to the nontraded capital
from the social perspective (a11 > 0), the system is unstable; and iii) if the nontraded goods
sector is labor intensive from the private perspective (a22 < 0); but nontraded capital inten-
sive from the social perspective (a11 < 0), then there are multiple (an in…nite number of)
convergent paths toward the steady state.
165 Factor Taxation and Indeterminacy
We show in this section that in the economy with international capital mobility, indetermi-
nacy may still arise even in the absence of externalities in the production functions. Other
distortions that introduce a wedge between private and social returns have the same e¤ect.
Here we study the role of factor taxation —in particular, policies that tax (or subsidize)
factors in an asymmetric way across sectors. Velasco (1993) and Schmidt-Grohé and Uribe
(1997) have already shown that certain kinds of taxation can induce “…scal increasing re-
turns” and hence indeterminacy (or even multiple steady states) in dynamic models. In our
setup there are no such “…scal increasing returns,” but taxation nonetheless causes indeter-
minacy.10 In order to simplify matters we conduct the analysis in the simpler framework
of Section 3. However, it is straightforward to extend the analysis and the results to the
general setup of Section 4.
Assume factor taxation consists of four di¤erent tax rates ¿KT;¿KN; ¿LT;¿LN on the












In order to abstract from issues related to the choice of public spending and to facilitate
comparison with results of previous sections, we assume that the revenue from factor taxes is
transferred back to households in lump sum fashion. Then it can be shown that the dynamic
equations for p and K become (see Appendix C):
_ p = p(r + ± ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ¿KN)p
¯
®¡¯) (54)
10Fiscal increasing returns occur when the tax rate has to be varied in the opposite direction to the taxable
factor in order to keep revenue …xed and equal to a constant exogenous level of expenditure. In our examples













K + V (p) (55)
where W(p) (> 0) and V (p) are functions of p: The two eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix



















We the have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 In the two-sector open economy with nontraded capital, i) if the nontraded
goods sector is labor intensive (or capital intensive) from both the private and social per-
spectives (Â1Â2 < 0), transitional dynamics exhibits saddle-path stability; ii) if the nontraded
goods sector is capital intensive from the private perspective (Â2 > 0) and labor intensive
from the social perspective (Â1 > 0), the system is unstable; and iii) if the nontraded goods
sector is labor intensive from the private perspective (Â2 < 0); but capital intensive from the
social perspective (Â1 < 0), then there are multiple (an in…nite number of) convergent paths
toward the steady state.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 for the indeterminacy case is simple. In previous
sections the presence of externalities broke the duality between the Rybczynski and the
Stolper-Samuelson e¤ects, allowing for alternative but non-explosive equilibrium paths. The
key is to have a wedge between private and social returns. Here that wedge is created by
the tax rates.






, the two inequalities
for indeterminacy or instability can not hold simultaneously. On the other hand, there are
a variety of policy combinations (if at least one of ¿LT = ¿LN;¿KT = ¿KN does not hold)
such that the two eigenvalues are both negative or both positive. Indeed, we can give one
useful example which may have important implications. In the case that nontraded goods
sector is capital intensive from social perspective (® > ¯), if government implements policies
such that ¿LT = ¿LN but ¿KT < ¿KN; the steady state is indeterminate. This example
18implies, strikingly, government policies that are preferential for traded goods sector (even
slightly) may be another source of economic ‡uctuations. Again, unfettered capital mobility
makes this occur much more easily for the same reason discussed in previous sections. In a
parallel analysis made in the closed economy environment as in Section 2, it is easy to show
that indeterminacy can not arise if government implements tax policies which are slightly
preferential to one of the consumption and capital goods sector.
6 Conclusions
Capital mobility makes it easier for the steady state of a standard neoclassical model to be
indeterminate. In the closed economy the utility function must be linear or close to it for
indeterminacy to occur, while in the open economy the shape of the utility function makes
no di¤erence. The reason is that in the autarchic case changes in aggregate investment must
be matched by changes in aggregate consumption, while in the case of full capital mobility
they can simply be …nanced by borrowing abroad.
Indeterminacy depends only on technology and factors a¤ecting it. In this model without
increasing marginal returns, distortions must exist that drive a wedge between private and
social returns. Those wedges can arise from externalities, but also from the presence of taxes
or equivalent distortions.
This general principle should prove useful in many applications. One future task is to see




For the closed economy in Section 2, the …rst-order conditions with respect to LT;LN;KT;and
KN yield























0(½q + ±q ¡ z) (58)
while law of motion (4) in the text becomes




N ¡ ±K (59)
Equation (58) can be written as
dq
dt















































which appears in Section 2. It is then easy from here to obtain the Jacobian matrix [J].
If the utility function takes the form of (10) in the text, the …rst-order condition with







20which, along with other …rst-order conditions, can be used to derive the expressions for
@YN
@K and @z
@q that are used in Section 2. For more derivations in detail, see Benhabib and
Nishimura (1998).












Here we provide the necessary derivations for Section 4. The consolidated budget constraint
is
_ a = ra + YT + pYN ¡ CT ¡ pCN ¡ E(r + ±e) + S(_ p ¡ rp ¡ ±sp) (63)
where a = b + E + pS. Optimality conditions are now
UT(CT;CN) = ¹ ¸ (64)
UN(CT;CN) = ¹ ¸p (65)
V



























































N = r + ±e (71)















































= r + ±e; (75)






















where ¢1;¢2 are positive constants. Substituting (76) and (77) into (70), we can get a _ p
equation which is the counterpart of equation (33) in Section 3.











We can use the same procedure in Section 3 to solve for SN (using (49), (48), (76) and (78)),
and then substitute it and (76), (77) into the market-clearing condition for good S, so as to
obtain the _ S equation.
227.3 Appendix C
Here we derive (54) and (55) in the text. The household budget constraint is now
_ b = (1 ¡ ¿LT)wLTLT + (1 ¡ ¿KT)rKTKT + p[(1 ¡ ¿LN)wLNLN
+(1 ¡ ¿KT)rKNKN] + rb ¡ CT ¡ pI + T (79)
where
T = ¿LTwLTLT + ¿KTrKTKT + p[¿LNwLNLN + ¿KTrKNKN] (80)
is the government budget constraint: the RHS is government tax revenue, and the LHS is
the government’s transfer to the household.



























































®¡¯; ´ > 0 (85)
Note that now ®(1 ¡ ¿LT);(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¿KT);¯(1 ¡ ¿LN) and (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ¿KN) play
the same role as ®0;®1;¯0 and ¯1 respectively in the model with externalities. The rest is
straightforward if we follow the same derivation procedure as in Section 3.
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           Figure 1:  When the nontraded good is capital intensive from both
          private and social perspective with or without externalities. XX is 







Figure 2: When the nontraded good is labor intensive from both
private and social perspective with or without externalities. XX






Figure 3: When the nontraded good is labor intensive from private
perspective, but capital intensive from social perspective with externalities.
There are an infinite number of convergent paths toward the steady state.
X1X1, X2X2, X3X3 are just examples.
dK/dt=0
X1
X3
X3